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Introduction. Aberrant experience of agency is characteristic of schizophrenia. An
understanding of the neurobiological basis of such experience is therefore of
considerable importance for developing successful models of the disease. We aimed
to characterise the effects of ketamine, a drug model for psychosis, on sense of
agency (SoA). SoA is associated with a subjective compression of the temporal
interval between an action and its effects: This is known as ‘‘intentional binding’’.
This actioneffect binding provides an indirect measure of SoA. Previous research
has found that the magnitude of binding is exaggerated in patients with
schizophrenia. We therefore investigated whether ketamine administration to
otherwise healthy adults induced a similar pattern of binding.
Methods. 14 right-handed healthy participants (8 female; mean age 22.4 years)
were given low-dose ketamine (100 ng/mL plasma) and completed the binding task.
They also underwent structured clinical interviews.
Results. Ketamine mimicked the performance of schizophrenia patients on the
intentional binding task, significantly increasing binding relative to placebo. The
size of this effect also correlated with aberrant bodily experiences engendered by
the drug.
Conclusions. These data suggest that ketamine may be able to mimic certain
aberrant agency experiences that characterise schizophrenia. The link to individual
changes in bodily experience suggests that the fundamental change produced by the
drug has wider consequences in terms of individuals’ experiences of their bodies
and movements.
Keywords: Actionoutcome binding; Ketamine; Schizophrenia; Sense of agency;
Volition; Voluntary action.
INTRODUCTION
Administration of the anaesthetic agent, ketamine, to healthy participants
produces a state that resembles schizophrenia (Ghoneim, Hinrichs, Me-
waldt, & Petersen, 1985; Krystal et al., 1994; Lahti, Weiler, Tamara
Michaelidis, Parwani, & Tamminga, 2001). Although there are notable
differences between the ketamine state and established schizophrenic illness
(for example, ketamine does not reliably produce auditory hallucinations;
Fletcher & Honey, 2006), ketamine does produce a range of symp-
toms associated with endogenous psychosis, including perceptual changes,
ideas of reference, thought disorder, and some negative symptoms (Ghoneim
et al., 1985; Krystal et al., 1994; Lahti et al., 2001; Mason, Morgan,
Stefanovic, & Curran, 2008; Morgan, Mofeez, Brandner, Bromley, &
Curran, 2004; Pomarol-Clotet et al., 2006). In addition, a number of
cognitive changes produced by ketamine are comparable to those seen in
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& Honey, 2006; attention: Oranje et al., 2000; language: Covington et al.,
2007). Overall, the effects of ketamine are most strikingly characteristic of
the earliest stages of psychosis (Corlett, Honey, & Fletcher, 2007). Moreover,
ketamine causes changes in brain activity that overlap with those reported in
schizophrenia (Breier, Malhotra, Pinals, Weisenfeld, & Pickar, 1997; Corlett
et al., 2006; Vollenweider, Leenders, Oye, Hell, & Angst, 1997; Vollenweider,
Leenders, Scharfetter, et al., 1997). An important next step is to explore the
effects of ketamine in greater detail and to exploit the potential that this
approach offers for relating cognitive-behavioural function to subjective
experiences in psychosis.
Schizophrenia is associated with important changes in the experience of
voluntary action such as those that occur in delusions of control (Frith,
1992). Although it has received little formal documentation, ketamine also,
in our experience, alters the way that participants experience their own
actions. For example, participants sometimes report that they don’t feel fully
in control of their own actions (‘‘I don’t feel in control of my muscles ...’’,
and ‘‘...as though someone else was controlling my movements’’; Pomarol-
Clotet et al., 2006). Given these observations, together with the perceptuo-
motor abnormalities in schizophrenia, the current study was set up to
characterise the effects of ketamine on a task examining voluntary actions
and their sensory consequences.
Sense of agency (SoA) refers to the experience of initiating and
controlling voluntary action to achieve effects in the outside world. Sense
of agency is a background feeling that accompanies most of our actions.
Perhaps because of its ubiquity, it has proved difficult to isolate and measure
experimentally. Recently, action-related changes in time perception have
been proposed as a proxy for SoA (Haggard, Clark, & Kalogeras, 2002;
Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Lagnado, Deal, & Haggard, 2009).
Situations that elicit SoA are associated with systematic changes in the
temporal experience of actions and outcomes: There is a subjective
compression of the interval between the action and the outcome. This
relation between SoA and subjective time is revealed in the intentional
binding paradigm developed by Haggard et al. (2002). In an agency
condition, in which participants’ actions produced outcome tones, partici-
pants judged the time of an action or the time of the subsequent tone, in
separate blocks of trials. Actions were perceived as occurring later in time
compared to a nonagency (baseline) condition in which participants’ actions
did not produce tones. In addition, a tone that followed the action was
perceived as occurring earlier in time compared to a nonagency (baseline)
condition involving tones but no actions. Importantly, these shifts were only
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movement the reverse pattern of results was observed (actions per-
ceived earlier and outcomes perceived later than their respective baseline
estimates).
Increased SoA is therefore associated with a later awareness of the action,
and an earlier awareness of the outcome. This effect is robust and has been
consistently replicated (see, for example, Engbert & Wohlschla ¨ger, 2007;
Engbert, Wohlschla ¨ger, & Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, & Haggard, 2009;
Tsakiris & Haggard, 2003). It has also been shown that these changes in the
subjective experience of time correlate with explicit higher order changes in
the sense of agency, as measured using subjective rating scales (Ebert &
Wegner, 2010; Moore & Haggard, 2010). In this way, intentional binding
offers a precise, implicit measure of SoA.
Of primary interest to the present study is the fact that the binding effect,
defined as the temporal attraction between voluntary action and outcome, is
greater in people with schizophrenia (Haggard, Martin, Taylor-Clarke,
Jeannerod, & Franck, 2003; Voss et al., 2010). That is, people with
schizophrenia show increased intentional binding. Our principal aim here
was to determine whether ketamine also induced increased binding, as
previously reported in schizophrenia.
We also investigated the relationship between this implicit measure of
SoA and subjective experiences of dissociation and psychotic-like phenom-
ena produced by the drug as measured using the Clinician-Administered
Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner et al., 1998). Here we focused
our analysis on changes in the subjective experience of one’s own body, since
sense of ownership (SoO) over one’s body and SoA may be related. For
example, in healthy individuals SoA for a voluntary action may strongly
depend on a SoO (Gallagher, 2000, 2007; Tsakiris, Schu ¨tz-Bosbach, &
Gallagher, 2007). The reverse relationship may also hold, whereby the
neurocognitive processes that give rise to sense of agency also contribute to
SoO (Tsakiris, Prabhu, & Haggard, 2006).
Dissociative symptoms, such as depersonalisation, are a common effect of
the ketamine challenge (Goff & Coyle, 2001). Furthermore, there is frequent
co-occurrence of depersonalisation and abnormal bodily experience (Sierra,
Baker, Medford, & David, 2005; Simeon et al., 2008). Although not typically
associated with established schizophrenic illness, depersonalisation appears
to be associated with the schizophrenia prodrome (Goff & Coyle, 2001;
Krystal et al., 1994). Therefore, given the link between bodily experience and
sense of agency, and the common disruption of bodily experience
engendered by the ketamine challenge, the body perception subscale on
the CADSS questionnaire was of primary interest.
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Participants
Eighteen right-handed healthy volunteers were recruited (eight female; mean
age22.4, range1926; mean NART IQ114 [97]). The study was
approved by Addenbrooke’s NHS Trust Research Ethics Committee.
Participants provided written, informed consent.
One participant was excluded from the analysis on the basis of a
preexisting history of psychiatric illness (although all participants were
screened for the presence of psychiatric illness in themselves and relatives
prior to taking part in the study, this participant only disclosed this
information after testing). Three participants failed to complete the
intentional binding task owing to nausea produced by the drug infusion.
Therefore, 14 participants were included in the final analysis.
These same participants also completed other cognitive tasks, unrelated
to SoA, during infusion. It is planned to publish those results elsewhere.
Experimental design
The study used a double-blind, placebo-controlled, randomised, within-
subjects design.
Infusion protocol
Participants were administered placebo (saline) or racemic ketamine
(2 mg/mL) as an intravenous infusion using a target-controlled infusion
system comprising a computer which implemented Stanpump software
(S Shafer; http://www.opentci.org/doku.php?idcode:code) to control a
syringe driver infusion pump (Graseby 3500; Graseby Medical Ltd,
Watford, UK). Stanpump was programmed to use a two-compartmental
pharmacokinetic model (Rigby-Jones, Sneyd, & Absalom, 2006), to imple-
ment a complex infusion profile designed to achieve prespecified plasma
ketamine concentrations.
During the drug session, participants received first low-dose ketamine
(plasma target 100 ng/mL) and then higher dose (plasma target 200 ng/mL).
The intentional binding task was completed at the low dose. Drug and
placebo sessions were separated by at least 1 week. Participants also
underwent a clinical rating (see later). The order of drug and placebo visits
was counterbalanced across all 18 participants initially recruited. Of the
14 participants who were included in the final analysis, eight participants
completed the ketamine session first.
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Participants watched a computer screen on which a hand rotated around a
clock-face (marked at conventional ‘‘5-minute’’ intervals) (see Figure 1).
Each full rotation lasted 2560 ms. In the agency condition, participants
pressed a key with their right index finger at a time of their choosing. This
keypress produced a tone after a delay of 250 ms. The clock-hand continued
rotating for a random period of time (between 1500 ms and 2500 ms). This
ensures that the finishing position of the clock-hand is not informative with
respect to where it was when the action or tone occurred (see Libet, Gleason,
Wright, & Pearl, 1983). When the hand stopped rotating, participants
verbally reported the time of their keypress or the subsequent tone. These
judgements were blocked, so participants only made a single type of estimate
on each trial in each block. To make the time estimates, participants
reported the position of the hand on the clock face when they either pressed
the key or heard the tone. Participants completed a block of 20 action
estimate trials and a block of 20 tone estimate trials.
Figure 1. Trial structure in the agency condition (following Haggard et al., 2002). Participants
pressed the key at a time of their choosing, which produced a tone after a delay of 250 ms. Participants
judged where the clock hand was when they pressed the key or when they heard the tone, in separate
blocks of trials.
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one block (baseline action) participants pressed the key at a time of their
choosing. However, the keypress never produced a tone, and on each trial
participants reported the time of the keypress. In the other block (baseline
effect) participants made no keypresses. Instead, a tone would sound at a
random time on each trial and participants reported the time of the tone.
The order of agency and baseline blocks was randomised anew for each
participant. All blocks (baseline and agency) were performed during the
drug/saline infusion.
For our analysis we calculated an overall measure of intentional binding.
We first calculated the binding effect for actions and tones individually.
Action binding is found by subtracting the mean time estimate in the
baseline action condition from the mean time estimate of actions in
the agency condition. Tone binding is found by subtracting the mean time
estimate in the baseline tone condition from the mean time estimate of tones
in the agency condition. The overall measure of intentional binding was
calculated by combining action and tone binding (i.e., action binding
minus tone binding). To determine the effect of ketamine on intentional
binding (and therefore SoA), this overall measure of intentional binding was
compared within subjects (ketamine vs. placebo; paired-samples t-test).
Clinical assessment
The Clinician-Administered Dissociative States Scale (CADSS; Bremner
et al., 1998) was administered at both 100 ng/mL and 200 ng/mL. There are
five subscales, each of which consists of items (questions), and participants’
responses are coded on a 5-point scale (0‘‘Not at all’’ through to
4‘‘Extremely’’). As discussed, our analysis focused primarily on the body
perception category. We assessed the strength of correlation betweenscores on
items relating to body perception at 100 ng/mL with binding on ketamine.
RESULTS
During the intentional binding task, the target plasma ketamine concentra-
tion was 100 ng/mL, and the mean9SD measured ketamine plasma
concentration was 157936 ng/mL.
Ketamine effects on intentional binding
Table 1 presents the binding effects for keypresses and tones (mean shifts
from baseline) for the 14 participants who completed the task. These data
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keypresses were bound towards tones and tones were bound back towards
keypresses. This is consistent with the intentional binding effect, as
previously reported (e.g., Engbert et al., 2008; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore
& Haggard, 2008).
Table 1 (final column) also presents the overall binding measure (keypress
binding minus tone binding). These data show that overall binding was
greater under ketamine compared with placebo. A paired-samples t-test
revealed that this difference was significant, t(13)2.79, p.008 (one-
tailed). Follow-up paired sample t-tests suggest that this difference is due to
differences in binding for actions towards tones, t(13)2.35, p.036 (two-
tailed) rather than differences in binding for tones towards actions, t(13)
0.242, p.812 (two-tailed). Furthermore, this exaggerated binding appears
to be driven by changes in baseline action judgements; isolated actions on
ketamine were perceived as occurring significantly earlier than on placebo,
t(13)2.59, p.023 (two-tailed). Intentional binding is an implicit measure
of SoA. These findings therefore suggest that SoA is exaggerated under
ketamine, which is consistent with previous data on patients with schizo-
phrenia (Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010).
The relation between binding and body perception
We also examined the strength of correlation between binding on ketamine
and scores on the CADSS assessment. The overall main effect of ketamine
was generated by changes in action binding. Therefore, our correlations
TABLE 1
Mean judgement errors in ms (SD across subjects) and shifts relative to baseline
conditions in ms
Judged
event
Mean (SD)
judgement
error (ms)
Mean shift from
baseline (ms)
(SD)
Overall binding
measure (ms)
(SD)
Baseline conditions
Placebo Action 4 (42)
Tone 14 (55)
Ketamine Action 24 (52)
Tone 8 (46)
Agency conditions
Placebo Action 26 (55) 22 (36)
Tone 37 (61) 23 (51) 45 (69)
Ketamine Action 28 (63) 52 (38)
Tone 28 (71) 20 (59) 72 (70)
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between action binding and the overall CADSS score, r.197, p499 (two-
tailed). Further analyses focused on the body perception subscale. There was
a significant positive correlation between action binding and Item 6 on the
CADSS, which asks, ‘‘Do you feel disconnected from your own body?’’,
r.549, p.042 (two-tailed) (see Figure 2). This suggests that the more
participants felt disconnected from their bodies on ketamine, the greater the
intentional binding effect. There was no significant correlation between
action binding and Item 7 on the CADSS which asks ‘‘Does your sense of
your own body feel changed: for instance, does your own body feel unusually
large or unusually small?’’, r.208, p.476 (two-tailed).
Control analyses
The CADSS questionnaire also measures changes in time perception. Given
the temporal nature of our SoA measure we investigated the putative
relation between binding and general changes in time perception. There were
no significant correlations between action binding and time perception items
on the scale (Item 1 ‘‘Do things seem to be moving in slow motion?’’,
r198, p.498; Item 12 ‘‘Does this experience seem to take much longer
than you would have expected?’’, r.337, p.238; Item 13 ‘‘Do things
seem to be happening very quickly, as if there is a lifetime in a moment?’’,
r.265, p.360). This suggests that changes in action binding were not
related to general changes in the subjective experience of time.
Figure 2. Scatter plot showing the signiﬁcant correlation between action binding and CADSS Item 6
(‘‘Do you feel disconnected from your own body?’’) on ketamine (100 ng/mL).
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compared mean overall binding on ketamine versus placebo, introducing
‘‘order’’ (ketamine first vs. placebo first) as a between-subjects variable. We
found no significant main effect of ‘‘order’’, F(1, 12)0.381, p.548, and
no significant interaction, F(1, 12)0.889, p.364. This suggests that
changes in binding were not linked to drug order.
We also compared standard deviations of time estimates across repeated
trials. These provide a measure of perceptual timing variability, with higher
standard deviations reflecting inconsistent timing performance. This may
indicate difficulty in using the clock for timing judgements, erratic allocation
of attention either to the action/ tone or to the clock, or general confusion.
The increase in binding on ketamine was driven by differences in the binding
of actions towards tones, so we focus on standard deviation of action time
estimates. On ketamine the mean standard deviation was 77 ms (SD32)
while on placebo it was 67 ms (SD18). Despite the numerical increase, the
difference in mean standard deviation was not significant, t(13)1.149,
p.271 (two-tailed). This suggests that changes in action binding were not
related to general changes in timing ability.
In a final control analysis, we investigated whether there was a significant
reduction in the speed of the self-paced response on ketamine, as it could be
that changes in binding are related to changes in motor function. On
ketamine the mean response latency was 3798 ms (SD1580), whereas
on placebo it was 3538 ms (SD1160). Despite the numerical increase in
response latency, this difference was not significant, t(13)0.945, p.362
(two-tailed). This suggests that changes in action binding were not related to
changes in motor function (as measured by the response latency).
DISCUSSION
We investigated whether the psychotomimetic effects of ketamine extend to
producing aberrant agency experiences associated with schizophrenia. On
the intentional binding task under placebo conditions, the expected binding
effect (a compression of the subjective interval between action and outcome;
Haggard et al., 2002) was observed. Under ketamine this effect was
exaggerated, as has been previously reported in people with schizophrenia
(Haggard et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010).
The effect of ketamine on actionoutcome binding is intriguing: The
exaggerated effect was driven primarily by an increase in binding of actions
towards the tone, rather than binding of tones back towards actions. Action
binding represents the difference between action time estimates in the agency
condition and action time estimates in the baseline condition. Previous
studies have found that the experience of isolated action, as in the baseline
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slightly before the actual onset of movement (Haggard, Newman, & Magno,
1999; Libet et al., 1983). This suggests that motor experience in this context
is not based on feedback generated by the actual movement itself. If it were,
one would expect a slightly delayed awareness of moving owing to inherent
delays in the transmission of sensory information to the brain (Obhi,
Planetta, & Scantlebury, 2009). Instead, it has been proposed that the
experience of isolated action is linked to processes occurring prior to
movement onset (Haggard, 2003). In our data, the baseline experience of
action on ketamine was significantly earlier than on placebo, whereas the
baseline action awareness on placebo was, unusually, slightly delayed relative
to the actual keypress. This pattern of results suggests that the drug may
have exaggerated the putative influence of action preparation on the
experience of action.
However, although baseline action experience is generally anticipatory,
the intentional binding effect in healthy adults shows that causing an
external event through one’s own actions (as in our agency condition)
draws the temporal experience of action towards that event (Engbert &
Wohlschla ¨ger, 2007; Haggard et al., 2002; Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore,
Lagnado, et al., 2009). It is this shift in action experience that represents
the binding effect for actions, and it was present on both placebo and
ketamine. However, the magnitude of the shift was significantly greater on
ketamine. It appears, therefore, that the presence of the tone exerted a
particularly strong influence on action experience. In short, although
ketamine has a strong effect on action experience when the action occurs
without a perceptual consequence, we cannot interpret the drug’s effect
merely in terms of this baseline action experience. Rather, the significantly
greater subjective shift, on ketamine, in the experience of action towards
the tone means that a full explanation of the effects of ketamine must take
into account the experience of action in both the absence and the presence
of the tone.
Thus, bringing together the key results from the intentional binding task,
ketamine appears to boost the influence of action preparation on action
awareness, but also to boost the influence of the effects of action (a tone) on
action awareness. This combination may seem paradoxical. However, several
results suggest that the action experience is in fact a synthesis of a range of
different events occurring over an extended time period between preparation
and consequence (Banks & Isham, 2009; Haggard, 2005; Haggard,
Cartledge,Dafydd,&Oakley,2004;Lau,Rogers,&Passingham,2007;Moore
& Haggard, 2008; Moore, Wegner, et al., 2009). In normal circumstances,
action awarenessislikelytobetheresultofintegrationofefferentandafferent
processes in the sensorimotor system (Moore & Haggard, 2008; Moore,
Wegner, et al., 2009; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Newen, 2008). On ketamine,
374 MOORE ET AL.however, the processes underlying this normal process of integration may be
compromised.
To this extent, our results are consistent with a ketamine-induced deficit
in monitoring action signals. Participants appeared to feel dissociated from
their own actions while on ketamine, since their representations of their own
actions were susceptible to influences from other events, such as their
original intentions and their subsequent effects. Confirmation of this
dissociative interpretation comes from the correlations found between
intentional binding and the specific CADSS item concerning the feeling of
disconnection from the body. Taken together, these findings suggest that
ketamine may preferentially influence a neural system for monitoring action.
As a result of this deficit, actions on ketamine become mutable and
vulnerable to capture by other events. However, given the apparently tight
coupling of SoO and SoA, the fact that increased SoA was associated with
an increase in the feeling of disconnection from one’s body may be
surprising. Dissociations between SoO and SoA are not uncommon in
psychiatric illness such as schizophrenia. For example, a patient with
passivity phenomena will recognise their actions as the movements of their
own body (preserved SoO) but will experience their actions as produced by
an external force (reduced SoA). However, these dissociations cannot
explain our finding that an increase in SoA was associated with reduced
SoO on ketamine. The mutability hypothesis discussed earlier may provide
an explanation: If ketamine engenders mutability in the experience of action,
then the more one’s experience of action is ‘‘captured’’ by external sensory
events the greater the externalisation of bodily experience may be, resulting
in the feeling of ‘‘disconnection’’ from one’s own body.
What might be the neurochemical and neuroanatomical basis of the
hyperbinding effect we observed? One possibility is that hyperbinding is the
product of aberrant prediction error signalling. Prediction error refers to
the mismatch between expectation and occurrence, and is used as a teaching
signal to drive causal associations between events (Dickinson, 2001).
Although midbrain dopamine neurons may signal a reward prediction error
(Schultz & Dickinson, 2000), others have argued that their activity profile
may reflect a novelty, salience, or surprise signal used by organisms to judge
whether or not they caused a surprising event to happen (Redgrave &
Gurney, 2006). We have previously shown that ketamine induces prediction
error responses to predictable events and thus increases the salience of those
events (Corlett et al., 2006). Neurochemically, ketamine may increase
dopamine and glutamate corelease, in the mesocortical pathway between
the midbrain and prefrontal cortex (Corlett et al., 2006; Corlett, Honey,
etal.,2007).Suchsignallinghasbeensuggestedtoregistersurpriseandpermit
its explanation (Lavin et al., 2005). Since associations between intention,
action, and outcome are well learned, the ketamine induced hyperbinding
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outcome causal associations, via aberrant prediction error signalling. Our
findings overall are compatible with the notion that the execution of action
and SoA may be linked by a simple computational principle (minimising
prediction error), which, when perturbed, could explain the varied phenom-
enology of psychosis (Corlett, Frith, & Fletcher, 2009; Fletcher & Frith,
2009).
The hyperbinding found previously in schizophrenia patients (Haggard
et al., 2003; Voss et al., 2010), and here found also with ketamine, suggests
an exaggerated SoA. A number of other studies, using different paradigms,
have reported data that are consistent with this interpretation. For example,
people with schizophrenia (including those experiencing passivity symp-
toms) are more likely than healthy controls to attribute the source of
distorted or ambiguous visual feedback of an action to themselves (Daprati
et al., 1997; Fourneret et al., 2002; Franck et al., 2001; Schnell et al., 2008).
This suggests a tendency towards over-attribution of sensory consequences of
movement to oneself (Synofzik et al., 2008). However, these data are at
odds with the feeling of reduced SoA that is typically reported by patients.
One solution to this paradox is offered by Franck et al. (2001), who have
suggested that patients with passivity symptoms have a tendency towards
self-attribution of extraneous events (see also Daprati et al., 1997). This
could result in a feeling of being influenced when observing another action,
and hyperassociation when observing action outcomes. In short, it may be
possible to recognise strongly the outcomes of one’s actions while at the same
time feeling a diminished sense of agency for the actions themselves. This
implies a distinction between feeling one is the author of action on the one
hand, and feeling one is the author of an effect on the other. This putative
distinction would be usefully explored in future studies.
It should also be noted that exaggerated SoA may be associated with
certain schizophrenia subtypes, particularly those with self-referential
symptoms. For example, patients with persecutory delusions feel a greater
sense of control over action outcomes compared with healthy and patient
controls (Kaney & Bentall, 1992). Therefore, the exaggerated agency effects
shown in previous patient studies could be driven by the presence of patients
with self-referential symptoms in these samples. Intriguingly, self-referential
symptoms are also a common effect of the ketamine challenge (Corlett,
Honey, & Fletcher, 2007; Honey et al., 2006). It may be, therefore, that the
increased SoA found in the current study is associated with this specific
effect of the drug.
Our study shows that ketamine can mimic aberrant agency experiences
associatedwith schizophrenia, but certain limitations of the task used should
be noted. Unlike previous intentional binding studies (Haggard et al., 2002),
we did not include any involuntary movement conditions. Using transcranial
376 MOORE ET AL.magnetic stimulation to induce involuntary movements, Haggard et al.
(2002) showed that the binding of actions and outcomes was specific to
voluntary, self-generated movement. In fact, when involuntary transcranial
magnetic stimulation (TMS)-induced movements were followed by tones,
they found a temporal repulsion between involuntary movement and tone.
We did not include this TMS condition because the focus of our
investigation was whether ketamine increased the magnitude of intentional
binding for voluntary actions. It would be interesting in the future to explore
the effect of the ketamine challenge on this ‘‘repulsion’’ effect.
Limitations of the paradigm should also be noted. Intentional binding
represents an implicit measure of agency experience. That is, participants are
not required to make explicit agency judgements, such as the attribution of
an observed movement to its correct origin (as in Farrer & Frith, 2002, for
example). Implicit measures have certain advantages, such as the quantifica-
tion of subjective experience, and the mitigation of demand effects. Also,
such tasks may allow us to detect subtle perceptual and cognitive changes
engendered by the drug and relate them to the early stages of psychosis.
However, there are certain drawbacks. Primarily, implicit measures will fail
to capture the broader phenomenology of SoA, in particular the highly
complex phenomenology associated with delusions of agency in established
psychosis. In the current study this limitation was mitigated somewhat by the
observation that changes in these subtle implicit measures correlate with
participants’ self-reports of drug-induced changes in body experience.
Finally, limitations of the ketamine model of schizophrenia should also be
acknowledged. For example, ketamine produces a range of symptoms
associated with endogenous psychosis (arguably a broader range than other
drug models of the disease; Krystal et al., 1994), but there are notable
exceptions (Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Furthermore, ketamine produces
changes that are not necessarily associated with schizophrenia, such as
euphoria (Fletcher & Honey, 2006). Although it is important to acknowl-
edge limitations of the drug model, we do not feel they undermine our
interpretation of the present data, given the fact that these data are
consistent with schizophrenic psychopathology and replicate previous
behavioural data from patients with the disease (Haggard et al., 2003;
Voss et al., 2010).
Despite these caveats, this study shows that the psychotomimetic property
of ketamine may extend to aberrant experiences of agency associated with
schizophrenia. In particular, ketamine mimics the exaggerated intentional
binding effect that has been found in association with the disease. The
pattern of results suggested a mutable experience of action on ketamine,
consistent with a deficit in the neural circuits for action monitoring. We
believe that these findings may be explained in terms of changes in stimulus
salience via aberrant prediction error signalling. Ketamine may be avaluable
KETAMINE AND ABERRANT AGENCY EXPERIENCE 377psychopharmacological model of aberrant agency experiences found in
schizophrenia. To this extent, it could be used to elucidate the neurobiolo-
gical and psychological basis of such aberrant experiences.
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